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I. INTRODUCTION
In its decision in Atkins v. Virginia, the United States
Supreme Court ruled the execution of a mentally retarded
defendant who has committed a capital crime is
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.1 The Court left to the individual states the
obligation to determine how to apply the holding of Atkins.2
Because of this, the states differ on the definition of mental
retardation, which party bears the burden of proof, the
standard of proof to be applied, and when the determination
of retardation should be made. Leaving the states to their own
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devices has denied some defendants full protection under the
Eighth Amendment. It is not necessary to enact a standard
mental retardation definition, because there are case-by-case
details that should be taken into consideration in proving the
existence of mental retardation of that individual defendant;
however, states should enact laws that uphold the Court’s
holding in Atkins by establishing that (1) the defendant bears
the burden of proof; (2) the standard of proof be
preponderance of the evidence, and (3) the determination of
mental retardation must be made prior to trial.

II. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEATH PENALTY AND HOW IT
APPLIES TO THE MENTALLY RETARDED
The United States Supreme Court has continuously
expressed that “death is different” when it comes to deciding
death penalty appeals.3 Since 1976, 1,350 people have been
executed in the United States.4 From 1976 to 2002, of those
executed, at least forty-four were defendants with mental
retardation.5 In fact, it was not until 2002 that the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged that mental retardation
limits a defendant’s culpability to a degree that renders the
death penalty cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.6
In its 2002 landmark, Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme
Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to execute a mentally
retarded defendant.7 Unfortunately, in its decision, the
Supreme Court failed to advise the states which burden of
proof standard should be used in determining a defendant’s
3

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Number of Executions by State And Region Since
1976, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG (last visited April 5, 2013),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976.
5
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., List of Defendants With Mental Retardation
Executed In The United States, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/list-defendants-mental-retardationexecuted-united-states (last visited April 5, 2013).
6
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath:
Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders And Excluding Them From
Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 82 (2003).
7
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
4
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alleged mental retardation.8 The Supreme Court’s failure to
define the standard of proof to apply and which party bears
the burden of proof, has denied mentally retarded capital
defendants equal protection and due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Chillingly, the failure by United
States Supreme Court to establish a standard of proof means
the difference between the defendant’s life and death.9
Therefore, states should enact laws treating allegations
of mental retardation as an affirmative defense, so like in other
affirmative defense cases, the defendant bears the burden of
proof. The states should further pass legislation standardizing
the proof required to be introduced by a capital defendant.
The standard of proof the states should adopt would be the
preponderance of the evidence standard. The preponderance
of the evidence standard would afford all capital defendants
alleging mental retardation protection under the United States
Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court also failed to set
forth in the Atkins decision when the determination as to a
defendant’s alleged mental retardation should be made,
causing inefficiency both in time and expense. Further, it
creates bias in the judicial system in some states. The states,
therefore, should uphold the United States Supreme Court
decision in Atkins and require that the determination as to a
defendant’s mental retardation be made prior to trial. Such a
procedure would be more likely to lead to a fair trial for
mentally retarded defendants and create an efficient judicial
process.
While the United States Supreme Court has righted the
wrong illustrated in the 1976 decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, it
did not provide practical recommendations to the states when
applying Atkins, and therefore the states should endorse the
Atkins holding to its fullest and intended effect so that
mentally retarded defendants convicted of a capital crime are
not denied their afforded protection under the United States
Constitution.
8

James Gerard Eftink, et al, Mental Retardation As A Bar To The Death
Penalty: Who Bears The Burden of Proof?, 75 MO. L. REV. 537, 568
(2010).
9
Id.
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III. THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY RETARDED PRIOR TO THE
DECISION IN ATKINS V. VIRGINIA WAS BASED ON A
“NATIONAL CONSENSUS”
The Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment;
however, whether or not it was intended by its founders, the
amendment has been dynamic because its scope has been
manipulated based on society’s progression.10 When the
Supreme Court reviewed the case of Penry v. Lynaugh, one of
the factors the Court seriously considered in determining
whether the execution of a mentally retarded man was
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual was society’s evolving
standard of decency.11
John Paul Penry was charged with the 1979 brutal
rape, beating, and fatal stabbing with a pair of scissors of a
woman in Texas.12 Penry, who had been on parole for another
rape conviction at the time he committed the murder, was
found competent to stand trial even though he was found to
be “mildly to moderately retarded” and had “the mental age
of a six-and-a-half year old.”13 At his trial, doctors testified
that Penry suffered from organic brain damage likely caused
at birth and had an IQ at the time of trial of fifty-four.14 Penry,
who was twenty-two years old at the time he committed the
crime, had not only the mental age of a six-and-a-half year old
child, but also the social maturity of a nine or ten-year-old
child.15 Still, the jury found Penry competent to stand trial,
convicted him, and sentenced him to death.16

10

Donald E. d'Entremont, Constitutional Law-Defendant's Mental
Retardation Does Not Preclude Imposition of the Death Penalty As Long As
the Sentencer Considers All Relevant Mitigating Evidence-Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989), 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 221, 224 (1990)
[hereinafter d'Entremont].
11
Id. at 224.
12
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 308.
16
Id.
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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Penry’s
conviction and sentence on direct appeal, determining that the
death penalty was not prohibited due to Penry’s allegation of
being mentally retarded. 17 Penry took his case to the District
Court, which denied relief.18 Thus, Penry appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the
District Court’s judgment.19
Penry’s case finally reached the United States Supreme
Court in 1989, to determine, inter alia, whether it was cruel and
unusual punishment to execute a mentally retarded person.20
Here, Penry argued his mental retardation acted as a
mitigating factor, and therefore he should have been
sentenced to a penalty less than death.21 In a five-to-four
decision, the Supreme Court found mental retardation is a
factor that may lessen a defendant’s culpability for a capital
offense, but it could not be concluded in Penry’s case that the
Eighth Amendment precluded the execution of a mentally
retarded person of Penry’s ability.22
In support of its decision, the Supreme Court stated
while mental retardation could be considered and given effect
as a mitigating factor in sentencing, there was not enough
evidence in Penry’s specific case to establish a national
consensus against execution of the mentally retarded.23 The
Court examined federal and state laws prohibiting such
executions, public opinion surveys, and the position of the
American Association on Mental Retardation, and found no
consensus at the time against executing mentally retarded
defendants.24 Therefore, the Court reasoned the states could
continue to execute mentally retarded defendants until state
legislatures reached a consensus prohibiting such executions.25
17

Penry v. Texas, 691 S.W.2d 636, 654-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 312.
19
Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 926 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
321 (2002).
20
Penry, 492 U.S. at 313.
21
Id. at 315.
22
Id. at 340.
23
Id.
24
d'Entremont, supra note 10, at 226.
25
Id.; Linda L. Hinton, Criminal Law-Imposing the Death Penalty on
Capital Defendants Who Are Mentally Retarded Is Not Prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment To The Constitution If Instructions To The Jury Allow
18
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While the state legislatures never did reach a consensus
prohibiting such executions, the Supreme Court came to that
decision thirteen years after Penry when it was asked to decide
the case of Atkins v. Virginia.

IV. THIRTEEN YEARS AFTER PENRY, THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT GOT IT RIGHT IN ATKINS BY BANNING
THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS
Thirteen years after the decision not to exclude the
mentally retarded from being sentenced to death was reached
in Penry, the Supreme Court decided that the death penalty
could no longer be used against the mentally retarded. In a
six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court reasoned in Atkins v.
Virginia, that executing a mentally retarded person violates the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 26
Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted in Circuit Court in
Virginia of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder and
was facing the death penalty.27 In the penalty phase, the
defense relied on testimony from a forensic psychologist who
had evaluated Atkins and concluded that he was “mildly
mentally retarded” based on interviews with people who
knew Atkins, a review of school and court records, and by
conducting an intelligence test, which indicated that Atkins
had a full scale IQ of fifty-nine.28 The jury sentenced Atkins to
death anyway, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a
second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a
misleading verdict form.29 At the resentencing, the forensic
psychologist testified again.30 However, the prosecution
presented an expert rebuttal witness who expressed the
opinion that Atkins was not mentally retarded, but rather was
of “average intelligence, at least,” and diagnosable as having

For The Consideration Of Mental Retardation As Mitigating Factor, 39
DRAKE L. REV. 921, 928-29 (1990).
26
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 308-09.
29
Id. at 309.
30
Id.
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antisocial personality disorder.31 The jury again sentenced
Atkins to death.32 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
Atkins’ death sentence stating it was “not willing to commute
Atkins’ sentence of death to life imprisonment merely because
of his IQ score.”33 Because of the gravity of the concerns of the
dissenters to the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision, and due
to the dramatic shift of the state legislative landscape that
occurred since the Penry decision, the Supreme Court decided
to grant Atkins certiorari.34 Justice Stevens delivered the
opinion of the Court stating:
Those mentally retarded persons who meet
the law's requirements for criminal
responsibility should be tried and punished
when they commit crimes. Because of their
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment,
and control of their impulses, however, they
do not act with the level of moral culpability
that characterizes the most serious adult
criminal
conduct.
Moreover,
their
impairments can jeopardize the reliability and
fairness of capital proceedings against
mentally retarded defendants. Presumably for
these reasons, in the 13 years since we
decided Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109
S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), the
American public, legislators, scholars, and
judges have deliberated over the question
whether the death penalty should ever be
imposed on a mentally retarded criminal. The
consensus reflected in those deliberations
informs our answer to the question presented
by this case: whether such executions are
“cruel and unusual punishments” prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution.35
31

Id.
Id.
33
Id. at 310 (citing Atkins v. Com., 534 S.E.2d 312, 321 (Va. 2000).
34
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
35
Id. at 306-07.
32
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V. INTERPRETATIONS POST-ATKINS BY THE STATES HAVE
RESULTED IN AN UNDERMINING OF THE ATKINS
HOLDING
After the decision was handed down in Atkins, the
individual states were left to decide how to apply the holding
to their own death penalty sentences.36 Each state has been left
to define mental retardation, to decide the necessary proof in
determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded, and to
determine whether or not a defendant could be sentenced to
the death penalty, because the United States Supreme Court
did not create a bright-line rule for any of those factors.37 As a
result, no uniform definition of mental retardation has been
established.38 Some states, such as Idaho, have applied a
definition of mental retardation that is viewed by some as so
limiting that it offends a defendant’s rights under the United
States Constitution.39 In Idaho, mental retardation is based on
a fixed IQ number, although experts agree that an IQ number
alone does not determine mental retardation.40 An Idaho
defendant with an IQ of 71 or above could be set to be
executed if convicted, even if that defendant could otherwise
qualify as being mentally retarded.41 Other states, such as
California, do not specify a certain IQ for determining mental
retardation.42 Rather, California defines mental retardation as
“significantly subaverage [sic] general intellectual functioning

36

Anna M. Hagstrom, Atkins v. Virginia: An Empty Holding Devoid of
Justice for the Mentally Retarded, 27 LAW & INEQ. 241, 241-42 (2009)
[hereinafter Hagstrom].
37
Id. at 242.
38
Id.
39
Am. Civil Liberties Union, Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty,
ACLU.ORG (Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/mentalretardation-and-death-penalty (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter
Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty].
40
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(1)(b) (West, WestlawNext current
through 2013); Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39.
41
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(1)(b) (West, WestlawNext current
through 2013); Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39.
42
Sara Catania, Death Row’s IQ Divide, L.A. TIMES OPINION (May 8,
2007), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oecatania8may08,0,1060490.story.
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existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested before the age of 18.”43
Inconsistencies also result, depending on when the
determination of mental retardation is made.44 In Louisiana
and Virginia, prosecutors have argued the determination
should always be made post-conviction by the same jury that
found the defendant guilty.45 In Louisiana, the determination
of mental retardation can be made pre-trial by a judge but
only if the prosecutor agrees the determination be made then,
otherwise it is left to sentencing by the jury.46 In Virginia, the
determination is made by the jury or the judge in non-jury
trials during the defendant’s sentencing.47
However,
efficiency in the administration of justice dictates that a pretrial determination on a defendant’s mental retardation would
save time and money associated with the prosecution of a
death penalty trial.48
Additionally, there have been irregularities among the
states in establishing the standard of proof necessary to
determine whether a defendant should be sentenced to
death.49 Currently sitting on death row in Georgia is Warren
Hill, an inmate with an IQ of 70, who was granted a stay of
execution on February 19, 2013, within thirty minutes of his
scheduled time to receive a lethal injection.50 In 1991, Hill was
43

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West, West, WestlawNext current with
urgency legislation through Ch. 526, except Ch. 352, of 2013 Reg.Sess.).
44
Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39; see also John
H. Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 689,
693 (2009).
45
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(C)(1)-(2) (West, WestlawNext
current through 2013 Reg Session); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1
(West, WestlawNext current through 2013 Reg. Session); Mental
Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39.
46
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 905.5.1(C)(1) (West, WestlawNext
current through 2013 Reg. Session); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., States That
Have Changed Their Statutes To Comply With the Supreme Court’s
Decision in Atkins v. Virginia, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG (last visited Mar. 3,
2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-have-changed-their-statutescomply-supreme-courts-decision-atkins-v-virginia.
47
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (West, WestlawNext current through
2013 Reg. Session).
48
Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 39.
49
Hagstrom, supra note 36, at 266.
50
Ed Pilkington, Georgia Inmate Warren Hill Granted Stay of Execution 30
Minutes Before Lethal Injection, GUARDIAN.CO.UK,

112

2 LMU LAW REVIEW (2015)

sentenced to death after he killed his cellmate in prison.51 Hill
was incarcerated at the time for killing his eighteen-year-old
girlfriend.52 In Georgia, a defendant who alleges intellectual
disability for avoiding the death penalty must prove the
disability beyond a reasonable doubt.53 Hill was sentenced to
the death penalty after he was unable to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was mentally retarded.54 The beyond
a reasonable doubt standard is one in which experts say is
almost impossible to achieve when using that standard to
assess mental retardations.55
Even those doctors who
diagnosed Hill with an IQ of 70, which constitutes mild mental
retardation, found it impossible to meet this standard.56 All
three of the doctors who examined Hill have reversed their
opinion that Hill had not met the legal definition of “mentally
retarded” and that their original evaluation of the Hill was
“extremely and unusually rushed.”57 Georgia continues to
hold capital defendants to the strictest standard of proof to
show intellectual disability should preclude the death
penalty.58 Georgia is an outlier, as twenty-eight of the thirty-

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/20/warren-hill-stay-of-execution
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Georgia Disabilities
Expert Calls for Halt to Execution of Inmate With Mental Retardation,
DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/georgiadisabilities-expert-calls-halt-execution-inmate-mental-retardation (last
visited Mar. 3, 2013); Eric Jacobson, The Supreme Court Must Stop the
Execution of Warren Hill, HUFF POST CRIME,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-jacobson/warren-hillexecution_b_2665094.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
51
Huffington Post, Warren Hill Execution Stayed: Georgia Death Row
Inmate Spared in Last Minute Decision, HUFF POST CRIME, (Feb. 19, 2013,
11:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/19/warren-hillexecution-stayed_n_2720700.html [hereinafter Warren Hill Execution
Stayed: Georgia Death Row Inmate Spared in Last Minute Decision].
52
Id.
53
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (West 2015); Warren Hill Execution Stayed:
Georgia Death Row Inmate Spared in Last Minute Decision, supra note 51.
54
Warren Hill Execution Stayed: Georgia Death Row Inmate Spared in
Last Minute Decision, supra note 51.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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three states with the death penalty use a lower standard for
proving mental retardation.59
One of those states which require a lower standard of
proof for avoiding the death penalty based on mental
retardation is Arizona. On January 3, 2013, “after more than
13 years and two trials,” the Arizona Supreme Court ruled
that Shawn Grell could not be executed because he was
mentally retarded.60 Grell’s sentence was reduced to life in
prison without possibility of parole for the 1999 murder of his
two-year-old daughter by lighting her on fire after dousing
her with gasoline.61 At trial, Grell’s attorneys failed to prove
by Arizona’s clear and convincing evidence standard that he
was mentally retarded.62 But on appeal, the Arizona Supreme
Court ruled that Grell was mentally retarded using a lower
standard of preponderance of the evidence.63 The Arizona
Attorney General’s Office plans to appeal the Arizona
Supreme Court’s ruling based on the fact that Grell was not
found mentally retarded under the higher legal standard of
clear and convincing evidence required by state law, but
instead by a standard of preponderance of the evidence.64 The
Arizona Attorney General intends to seek legislation that
would clarify the standard for future cases involving
defendants who claim to be mentally retarded since Grell was
found mentally retarded by preponderance of the evidence
even though the statute in Arizona requires a defendant to
59

The New York Times, An Intolerable Burden of Proof, THE OPINION
(Nov. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/opinion/an-intolerable-burden-ofproof.html?_r=0 (last visited Aug. 8, 2012).
60
Arizona v. Grell, 291 P.3d 350, 357 (Ariz. 2013); Jim Walsh, Arizona
Court Reduces Shawn Grell’s Death Sentence to Life, AZCENTRAL.COM
(Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.azcentral.com/community/mesa/articles/20130109arizonacourt-reduces-shawn-grell-death-sentence-life-brk.html (hereinafter Walsh).
61
Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra note 60.
62
Grell, 291 P.3d at 351; Walsh, supra note 60; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-753(g) (West, WestlawNext legislation effective June 20, 2013 of the
First Regular Session of the Fifty-first Legislature).
63
Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra note 60 (“Teachers and school
officials were reluctant to label Grell as retarded for fear of angering his
mother, referring to behavioral disorders instead when assigning him to
special-education classes.”).
64
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753; Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra
note 60.
PAGES
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prove mental retardation by a clear and convincing evidence
standard.65
Those defendants on death row prior to the decision in
Atkins have also met obstacles in appealing their sentences.
The Fifth Circuit denied Bruce Webster, an inmate on federal
death row for the 1994 kidnapping, rape, and murder of an
Arkansas teen, an appeal to prove he was mentally retarded,
because he had exhausted his appeals to the point where new
evidence to prove his intellectual disability was not allowed
unless that new evidence could show that Webster was
innocent.66 The allegedly weak weight of Webster’s new
evidence, including three doctors who diagnosed him as
mentally retarded, and the fact he had applied for Social
Security Disability benefits due to his mental retardation the
year prior to the murder he committed, was not the reason for
the denial by the Fifth Circuit and affirmation by the United
States Supreme Court.67 Rather, a 1996 federal criminal law
severely limiting the number of appeals an inmate can make
stopped Webster from possibly establishing his mental
retardation post-Atkins.68
Even inconsistencies in applying the bare bones ruling
of Atkins (no death penalty sentence for the mentally retarded)
have been felt since its decision was entered. In August 2012,
Marvin Wilson, a defendant with an IQ of 61, was executed in
Texas.69 Generally, an IQ of around 70 or as high as 75
65

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753; Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra
note 60.
66
United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 2005); Scott
Goldstein, High Court Denies Appeal of Mentally Retarded Man Who
Helped Rape, Kill Arlington Teen, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Dec. 7,
2010, 6:54 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/communitynews/arlington/headlines/20101207-high-court-denies-appeal-of-mentallyretarded-man-who-helped-rape-kill-arlington-teen.ece [hereinafter
Goldstein].
67
United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2005); Goldstein,
supra note 66.
68
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104–
132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996); Goldstein, supra note 66.
69
David R. Dow, Supreme Court Outlawed Executing Mentally Retarded,
But Texas Does It Anyway, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 14, 2012, 4:45 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/14/supreme-court-outlawedexecuting-mentally-retarded-but-texas-does-it-anyway.html (last visited
Aug. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Dow]; Kate Randall, Texas Executes Mentally
Disabled Death Row Prisoner, WORLD SOCIALIST WEBSITE (Aug. 8, 2012),
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indicates limited intellectual functioning.70 Texas allowed for
the execution of Wilson, convicted of murdering a police
informant in 1992, using precedent from the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals decision established in Ex parte Briseno.71 In
Ex parte Briseno, a mentally retarded defendant was executed
because his retardation was deemed to be mild.72 From this
2004 case, Texas uses a “Briseno factors” test to determine
mental retardation.73 These “Briseno factors” are arguably
subjective and stereotypical and without any scientific data to
back them up.74 These factors include but are not limited to
asking people who knew the defendant whether they thought
he was “mentally retarded” to whether the crime committed
required forethought.75
On February 29, 2012, Arizona executed Robert
Moorman, who was diagnosed as being mentally retarded and
having attended special education classes while in public
school.76 Moorman was sentenced to death for the 1984
murder of his adoptive mother who he killed while out on a
three-day furlough while serving a nine-year prison term for

http://www.wsws.org/Fen/articles/2012/08/wils-a08.html (last visited Aug.
19, 2013) [hereinafter Randall].
70
Am. Ass’n of Intellectual and Dev’l Disabilities, Definition of Intellectual
Disability, AIDD.ORG, http://www.aaidd.org/content_100.cfm?navID=21.
71
Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Dustin Volz,
Court Also Rejects Appeal for Man Scheduled to Die Next Week, Tucson
Sentinen.com (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:31 AM),
http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/022912_az_executions/manput-death-after-last-minute-appeals-fail/, David R. Dow, Supreme Court
Outlawed Executing Mentally Retarded, But Texas Does It Anyway,
U.S.NEWS (Aug. 14, 2012, 4:45 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/14/supreme-court-outlawedexecuting-mentally-retarded-but-texas-does-it-anyway.html.
72
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 18; Dow, supra note 68.
73
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8; Randall, supra note 68.
74
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8; Randall, supra note 68.
75
John H. Blume et. al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical
Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 689, 712 (2009).
76
Michael Kiefer, Execution to Conclude Shocking Arizona Murder Case,
NEWS (Feb. 25, 2012, 10:19 PM),
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/20120224arizona-murder-caseexecution-moormann.html [hereinafter Kiefer].
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the 1984 kidnapping and molesting of a nine-year-old girl.77 A
defendant in Arizona, by clear and convincing evidence, must
prove the criteria of being mentally retarded to avoid the
death penalty under Atkins.78 One doctor witness, who often
testifies against inmates, said Moorman was “absolutely”
mentally disabled, which would make it illegal for Arizona to
execute him because of Atkins.79 Other doctors said that
Moorman’s intellect was just above someone who is legally
considered mentally disabled.80
Ten years after the Atkins decision, Alabama reduced
the sentence of one of their longest serving death row inmates
because of the defendant’s intellectual disability. Bobby
Tarver, convicted in 1982 of murdering a taxi cab driver, had
his death sentence overturned by a federal judge because of
Tarver’s mental retardation.81 In 2003, Melanie Anderson’s
sentence to the death penalty for the 1994 beating and torture
death of her boyfriend’s three-year-old niece was reversed to
life in prison after she was deemed mentally retarded.82

VI. STATES SHOULD REQUIRE THAT A DEFENDANT BEAR THE
BURDEN OF PROOF IN SHOWING MENTAL RETARDATION
AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Currently, only fourteen of the thirty-three states with
the death penalty have enacted statutes shifting the burden of

77

Arizona v. Moorman, 744 P.2d 679, 681-82 (Ariz. 1987); Kiefer, supra
note 76 (Moorman’s representatives said he killed his adoptive mother after
years of suffering sexual abuse from her).
78
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753(G); Arizona v. Grell, 291 P.3d 350, 352
(Ariz. 2013).
79
Moorman, 744 P.2d at 688; Kiefer, supra note 76.
80
Moorman, 744 P.2d at 688; Kiefer, supra note 76.
81
Tarver v. Thomas, No. 07-00294-CG-B, 2012 WL 4461710, at *20 (S.D.
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6, 2012, 3:53 PM),
http://blog.al.com/live/2012/12/judge_changes_sentence_of_mobi.html.
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North Carolina v. Anderson, 94 CRS 5669, 95 CVR 887 (N.C. Gen. Ct.
Justice Superior Ct. Div. July, 29, 2003); Jerry Lankford, A Look at Capital
Punishment and Wilkes County Moratorium on Executions Possible, THE
RECORD (June 11, 2003),
http://www.therecordofwilkes.com/newsa.asp?edition_number=187&pg=F.

HELP WANTED

117

proving mental retardation to the defendant.83 Since the
decision in Atkins, three states have not set a standard of proof
at all, but still require that the defendant prove his or her
mental retardation.84 Historically, the prosecution bears the
burden of proof in criminal cases; however, as to certain
defenses, various jurisdictions assign one or more of the
burdens to the defense.85 When it comes to proving an
affirmative defense, federal courts have upheld statutory law
requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proof.86 A
defendant uses an affirmative defense to admit that he has
acted in the way in which he has been accused, but that his
conduct was justifiable, excusable, or could be mitigated for a
particular reason, and therefore should reduce or negate the
crime which he has been charged with.87 Mental retardation
should, therefore, be considered an affirmative defense and
shift the burden of proof to the defendant because it is offered
by the defendant to excuse or mitigate his actions in an effort
to avoid being sentenced to death. In further support that the
burden should be borne by the defendant, it should be noted
that no state statute currently exists that places the burden on
the prosecution to prove that the defendant is not mentally
retarded.88 Once the states enact legislation placing the
burden of proof with the defendant, the question becomes
what that standard of proof should be.
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VII. STATE SHOULD REQUIRE THAT A DEFENDANT PROVE
MENTAL RETARDATION USING A PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE STANDARD TO AVOID UNDERMINING THE
HOLDING OF ATKINS
Because the United States Supreme Court did not set a
standard of proof to be applied by the states in Atkins, state
legislatures are permitted to enact any or no laws mandating
what standard their state will apply as long as it is
“appropriate.”89
The function of a standard of proof, as that
concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause
and in the realm of fact finding, is to “instruct
the factfinder concerning the degree of
confidence our society thinks he should have in
the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication.”90
Since the Atkins decision, three states with the death penalty
have not set a standard of proof.91 Six states with the death
penalty have enacted statutes requiring a preponderance of
the evidence standard, with eighteen death penalty states
keeping their pre-Atkins preponderance of the evidence
standard.92 Four states with the death penalty require a clear
Ed Pilkington, Georgia Lawyers Rush To Save ‘Mentally Retarded’
Death Row Inmate, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2013, 9:56 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/17/warren-hill-georgia-inmateexecution#cb=f39e0ebe6227d6&origin=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.guardian.c
o.uk%2Ff3928fdbf733eb8&domain=www.guardian.co.uk&relation=parent
&error=unknown_user.
90
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Pruitt, 834 N.E. 2d at 102; Rolon, supra note 83.
92
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2013),
http://www.judges.org/capitalcasesresources/bookpdf/appendices/Case%20
and%20Statute%20References%20for%20Mental%20Retardation.pdf; see
Smith v. Alabama, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 91, 32-33 (Ala. May 25, 2007) (citing
Morrow v. Alabama, 928 So. 2d 315, 323 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); see also
Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1341 n.21 (N.D. Ala. 2006));
A.C.A. § 5-4-618(a)(2),(c) (2008); CAL. PEN. CODE. § 1376(b)(3) (2008);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1102(2) (2008); see also Colorado v. Vasquez,
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and convincing evidence standard.93 Only one state with the
death penalty, Georgia, requires that a defendant prove
mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt standard.94
First, we must look at the standards of proof that fail to
uphold the intention of Atkins to move toward the correct
standard of proof that should rest upon the defendant.
Placing a standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt
upon a defendant is unconstitutional because it makes it
almost impossible for those capital defendants with mental
retardation from proving their condition.95 For example, a
capital defendant who alleges mental retardation in Georgia
has to introduce more evidence than a capital defendant
alleging mental retardation in any other state and that proof
must show with “virtual certainty” that the defendant is
mentally retarded.96 Consequently, doubt can easily be

84 P.3d 1019 (Colo. 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(3) (2008); 725 ILCS 5/114-15(b) (2009); Bowling
v. Kentucky, 163 S.W.3d 361, 382 (Ky. 2005); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art.
905.5.1(C)(1) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Law § 2-202(b)(2)(ii); see
Chase v. Missouri, 873 So.2d 1013, 1029 (Miss. 2004); MO. REV. ST. §
565.030.4(1) (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01(4) (2008); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 174.098.5(b) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(c), (f)
(2008) (standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence if determined by
a jury, clear and convincing evidence if determined by a court); Ohio v.
Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002); Murphy v. Oklahoma, 54 P.3d
556, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002); Blonner v. Oklahoma, 2006 OK CR 1,
6-8 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006); see Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606
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93
Rolon, supra note 83; The National Judicial College, Case and Statute
References for Mental Retardation, JUDGES.ORG (last visited April 12,
2013),
http://www.judges.org/capitalcasesresources/bookpdf/appendices/Case%20
and%20Statute%20References%20for%20Mental%20Retardation.pdf;
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02(G) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(4)
(2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-4(b) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A2005(c), (f) (2008).
94
Rolon, supra note 83; O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (2008)
95
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Went Out In Georgia, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2013, 11:54 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/executing-thementally-retarded-the-night-the-lights-went-out-in-georgia/273088/.
96
Poe, supra note 87, at 420.

119

120

2 LMU LAW REVIEW (2015)

introduced by expert testimony and an effective opposing
expert can raise doubt enough to sentence a defendant to
death who would otherwise be considered mentally
retarded.97 The United States Supreme Court has never
“suggested much less held, that a burden of proof standard on
its own can so wholly burden an Eighth Amendment right as
to eviscerate or deny that right.”98 Because of their disabilities
in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses,
the mentally retarded do not act with the level of moral
culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct.99 Requiring such a high standard of proof such as
Georgia’s standard denies a capital defendant protection and
due process and undermines the Atkins holding.
Clear and convincing evidence is “evidence indicating
that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably
certain.”100 At least one state has found that a clear and
convincing evidence standard placed on a defendant trying to
prove mental retardation is unconstitutional under Atkins.101
In Pruitt v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana reasoned that
assigning the clear and convincing evidence standard to a
defendant to prove his allegation of mental retardation in
avoiding a sentence of death was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment because “the defendant’s right not to be executed
if mentally retarded outweighs the state’s interest as a matter
of federal constitutional law.”102 The Indiana Supreme Court
analogized the Pruitt case with Cooper v. Oklahoma, which
found that requiring a defendant to prove his competence to
stand trial by a clear and convincing evidence standard was a
violation of his right to due process.103
In Cooper v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme Court
unanimously decided that a defendant did not have to prove
his competency to stand trial by a clear and convincing
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The New York Times, An Intolerable Burden of Proof, THE OPINION
(Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/opinion/anintolerable-burden-of-proof.html?_r=0.
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99
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.
100
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Id. (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 369 (1996)).
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standard because it was too high of a burden.104 The Court
reasoned that assigning a burden of clear and convincing
evidence to the defendant places a “significant risk of an
erroneous determination that the defendant is competent.”105
Further, the Court found that a clear and convincing evidence
standard allocates a large share of the risk to the defendant.106
The Court reasoned the clear and convincing evidence
standard was such a harsh standard that it violates a
defendant’s right to due process of law and that the standard
assigned should be a preponderance of the evidence
standard.107
While the Cooper case was to determine
competency to stand trial, it should still be looked to for
guidance in deciding the standard to assign a capital
defendant alleging mental retardation because the issues are
analogous.
The “more stringent the burden of proof a party must
bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous
decision.”108 To avoid an erroneous decision being made in a
decision as important as life or death of a defendant, states
should require that at a maximum the standard of proof
assigned to a capital defendant alleging an affirmative defense
of mental retardation is the standard of preponderance of the
evidence. A standard of preponderance of the evidence means
“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free
the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to
incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather
than the other.”109 Currently, the majority of states that have
enacted legislation requiring the capital defendant prove their
mental retardation by a certain burden of proof have chosen
that burden to be by a preponderance of the evidence.110
States should treat a determination of mental
retardation similar to the United States Supreme Court’s
104
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treatment of competency for trial and require that the standard
of proof that a capital defendant must prove be by a
preponderance of evidence.111
The argument for this
treatment is: the risk to a capital defendant who must meet a
burden higher than preponderance of the evidence is dire,
whereas the risk to the state is modest.112
When the burden of proof is at the lower standard of
preponderance of the evidence, success by capital defendants
claiming mental retardation is not frequent, which illustrates
that a preponderance of the evidence standard is not just a
“free pass” for a capital defendant alleging mental retardation
trying to avoid the death penalty.113 For example, in Virginia,
which requires a capital defendant prove mental retardation
by a preponderance of the evidence, the success rate is zero
percent for the six capital defendants who have alleged mental
retardation to avoid the death penalty.114 Similarly, Alabama,
which has a preponderance of the evidence standard, has only
a twelve percent success rate for the twenty-six capital
defendants who have alleged mental retardation to avoid the
death penalty.115
Therefore, subjecting a capital defendant to prove an
allegation of mental retardation at any standard higher than
preponderance of the evidence would shift the allocation of
risk, and would be dire for the defendant’s defense. All states
with the death penalty should refine their legislation by
joining the majority of states and mandate that the standard of
proof be preponderance of the evidence to avoid deflating the
Atkins holding.
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VIII. STATES SHOULD ENACT STATUTORY LAW REQUIRING
THAT THE DETERMINATION OF A DEFENDANT’S
ALLEGED MENTAL RETARDATION BE DECIDED PRIOR
TO THE TRIAL COMMENCING
The determination of whether a capital defendant is
mentally retarded by the standard of preponderance of the
evidence should be made prior to trial. This would eliminate
any bias that may occur by the factfinder if the determination
was made after the guilt phase and to encourage efficiency of
resources, time, and expense.
Mental retardation is a
“threshold issue that determines whether a defendant is
eligible for capital punishment at all.”116 Currently, in many
states, the same jury that finds a defendant guilty during the
guilt phase of the trial decides whether to impose the death
penalty by considering any aggravating or mitigating
factors.117 Consideration of a capital defendant’s mental
retardation during the penalty phase, in addition to being
made by the same jury that found a defendant guilty during
the guilt phase, can cause a higher risk of wrongful execution,
because “[m]entally retarded defendant[s] may be less able to
give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically
poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes.”118 While the determination of a mental retardation
includes fact-finding, mental retardation itself “is not the
functional equivalent of an element of a crime;” therefore,
determination by a jury is not constitutionally required under
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
may be left to the judge to decide prior to trial.119
Proceeding as a noncapital case conserves significant
resources by reducing litigation expenses and expediting the
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overall proceedings.120 Trying a capital defendant is more
time consuming, expensive, and leads to a greater use of state
legal resources because the government must avoid errors,
which could prove fatal, in trying a death penalty case.121
Allowing a trial judge to issue a pre-trial determination as to a
capital defendant’s mental retardation is “economical in terms
of the time and cost that might be saved by avoiding a capital
trial.”122 In light of that fact, “every effort must be made to
avoid a death-penalty trial, as early in the proceedings as
possible, where capital punishment is precluded as a matter of
law.”123 Additionally, should a determination of mental
retardation be made by the judge prior to trial, an otherwise
capital defendant could decide to plea, thus expediting the
judicial process.124
Therefore, to provide full constitutional protection to a
capital defendant and to encourage efficiency of the criminal
system in applying Atkins, the states should enact legislation
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that leaves determination of a capital defendant’s alleged
mental retardation to the judge prior to the guilt phase.

IX. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court condemned the
execution of mentally retarded capital defendants in Atkins
because it studied the national consensus, which illustrated
that the goals of the criminal justice system cannot be met by a
person, who because of his mental limitations, cannot
understand the consequences or wrongfulness of his actions.
Because the Supreme Court left it to the states to apply the
Atkins holding, the states should enact certain laws to protect
the Court’s intention of not violating a capital defendant’s
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United
States Constitution. States should enact legislation that (1)
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant because an
allegation of mental retardation is an affirmative defense that
should be borne by the defense, (2) sets a standard of
preponderance of the evidence as the maximum standard of
proof a capital defendant must meet to prove mental
retardation because any higher standard of proof would
unfairly allocate an erroneous risk to the defense that could
mean death for someone who would otherwise be exempted
from the death penalty, and (3) requires the determination of
mental retardation be made prior to the penalty phase to
encourage efficiency in time and expenses and to discourage
bias. Justice requires no less.

